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ABSTRACT. The South China Sea (SCS) is becoming an increasingly contentious 
source of geopolitical tension due to its significance as an international trade route, 
possessor of potentially significant oil and natural gas resources, China’s increasing 
diplomatic and military assertiveness, and the U.S.’ recent and ongoing Pacific Pivot 
strategy. Countries as varied as China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and other 
adjacent countries have claims on this region’s islands and natural resources. China 
has been particularly assertive in asserting its SCS claims by creating a nine-dash 
line map claiming to give it de facto maritime control over this entire region without 
regard to international law on claimed land features and without providing trans- 
parency for the rationale behind its assertions. Regional countries are responding by 
increasing defense spending and developing responses to Chinese assertiveness such 
as the 2014 Australia-Japan defense technology sharing agreement. This presentation 
will examine the reactions to Beijing’s assertiveness by other Asian-Pacific coun- 
tries including Australia, Japan, other Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. It 
incorporates research and analysis from scholarly literature and multiple national 
and international government organizations. This work concludes by advocating that 
the U.S. and its allies take more assertive positions to counteract Beijing’s claims to 
this region. 
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The beginning of Fall 2015 sees international attention justifiably focused on 
the military confrontation between the U.S. and various allies and the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria and spillover refugee migration from this conflict into 
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the European Union. International geopolitical attention during this year has 
also been focused on Russian annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s aggres- 
siveness toward Ukraine, and ongoing areas of crisis involving Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Pakistan. While all of these international security crisis centers are 
important, geopolitical observers must also recognize the SCS’ increasing 
strategic importance and source of international tension during the second 
decade of this millennium. 
     This body of water encompasses nations as diverse as China, the Philip- 
pines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia and affects the trading and strategic 
interests of many world countries including the Australia, India, Japan, and 
the United States. It is a semi-enclosed area bordered on the west by Vietnam, 
on the east by Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines, on the south by 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and on the north by China and Taiwan covering an 
area approximately 550–650 nautical miles wide and a length of over 1,200 
nautical miles. China’s growing diplomatic, economic, and military power 
have increased Beijing’s assertiveness toward the SCS and culminated in it 
issuing the following nine-dashed map to highlight its territorial, island, 
seabed, and waterborne claims to this region with an another map reflecting 
the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the SCS claimed by adjacent 
countries. Concern over increasing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS and the 
issuance of this map is reflected in multiple sources.1 
 
                          Courtesy: STRATFOR 
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Source: UNCLOS and CIA 
 
Researching this region’s geopolitical influence and significance is important 
for Chinese scholars as reflected in an increase in the number of published 
journal articles on the nine-dashed map between January 2000–December 
2012 from 21 between 2000–2002 to 189 between 2010–2012 according to a 
search of the database China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI).2  
Such research must also be of global provenance and significance due to the 
estimated 40% of international trade passing through SCS waters, the in- 
creasing levels of defense spending by adjoining countries, SCS’ potential 
fossil fuel energy resources, and ongoing Chinese efforts to build floating 
islands in the SCS and land reclamation efforts including constructing a new 
runway on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Archipelago, creating land masses 
in the Spratly’s Subu Reef, and developing a helipad and air defense site on 
Gavin Reef to bolster its geopolitical claims and deter the interests of geo- 
graphically adjoining claimant powers and the geopolitical interests of powers 
as far away as the United States. This behavior by Beijing is contrary to the 
2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which China has signed and urges 
ASEAN countries to respect freedom of navigation and regional overflight 
in this area while also exercising self-restraint in conducting activities which 
could escalate disputes or affect regional stability such as occupying unin- 
habited islands or other features including reefs, shoals, and cays. Chinese 
behavior and policies in the SCS also need to be critical parts of foreign and 
national security policy discussion during the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
campaign.3   
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Fiery Cross Reef-Courtesy: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative– 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
These claims, according to Beijing, reflect and are justified by the experience 
of historic surveying expeditions, fishing, and naval activities dating back to 
the 15th century. Claims to this area are also reflected in a 1947 map drawn 
by the defunct Kuomintang government and reaffirmed in official maps pub- 
lished by the People’s Republic of China from 1949-present. China’s lofty 
sense of its historical maritime influence was demonstrated in an October 24, 
2003 address to the Australian Parliament, when Chinese President Hu 
Jintao claimed that Chinese mariner Zheng He’s exploration fleet had sailed 
as far south as Australia in the 1420s. A 2013 map issued by China’s State 
Bureau of Surveying and Mapping adds a tenth dash placed east of Taiwan 
incorporating that nation into China within 70 miles of Yonaguni which is 
Japan’s westernmost island in the Ryukyu Island chain. This map is also 
featured as a background in new Chinese passports drawing protests from 
the Philippines and Vietnam.4  
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Ten-dash map including Taiwan as part of China.  
Courtesy: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 
 
In May 2009 Beijing’s submitted a claim to the United Nations Commission 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international organization striving to 
establish a legal framework governing all uses of oceans, using the nine-
dashed map claiming indisputable sovereignty over the entire body of water, 
islands, seabed, and subsoil within the 200 mile nautical limits of the Outer 
Continental Shelf.5 This action produced acute concern among other neigh- 
boring states with Malaysia and Vietnam filing a joint submission to UNCLOS 
this same month contending that there are unresolved disputes in the terri- 
torial area defined by the Chinese submission, that Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi 
and have worked to get the cooperation of other adjacent coastal states, that 
this claim adheres to UNCLOS Article 76 covering continental shelf claims, 
and that these two countries may make further supporting claims on this 
topic to UNCLOS.6 
 
Natural Resources and Trade Routes 
 
The SCS is a major international trade route, adjoining nations are large 
energy resource consumers, and it is also the site of potentially monumental 
energy resources. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) notes 
that non-OECD liquid fuel consumption in Asian countries is expected to 
grow annually by 2.6% from 20% of global consumption in 2008 to over 
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30% of global consumption by 2035. EIA also projects non-OECD Asian 
natural gas consumption to grow 3.9% annually from 10% of global natural 
gas consumption in 2008 to 19% by 2035 with China projected to account 
for 43% of this growth.7 
     EIA also estimates that the SCS contains nearly 11 billion barrels of oil 
and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves. In 
addition, the U.S. Geological Survey has done additional analysis of potential 
undiscovered conventional oil and gas fields in several Southeast Asia geol- 
ogic provinces in 2010 as part of its World Petroleum Resources Assessment 
Project. This study concluded that there could be between 5 and 22 billion 
barrels of undiscovered oil and 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered 
natural gas in these regions though the cost of extracting these resources 
would be high.8 
     Over half of annual global merchant fleet tonnage passes through the 
Lombok, Malacca, and Sunda Straits continuing to the SCS including nearly 
1/3 of global crude oil and over ½ of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
trade passing through the SCS. Asia’s growing energy demand leads EIA to 
expect increased oil flow from producers in the Persian Gulf and Africa to 
pass through the SC S with the Malacca Strait being the shortest sea route 
between these suppliers and Asian markets. This also applies to LNG trade 
with SCS countries importing from supplier countries as varied as Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Qatar accounting for nearly 75% of LNG exports 




China insists its historic claims cover four major archipelagic groups in the 
SCS-Spratlys (Nanha), Paracels (Xisha), Pratas (Dongsha), and Macclesfield 
Bank (Zongsha) along with Scarborough Reef (Huangyan Island). There is 
considerable debate over whether China has claimed these areas since ancient 
times, whether Beijing claims sovereignty over geographic features such as 
islands, reefs, and shoals failing to meet UNCLOS definition of an island 
under international law, and the validity of Beijing’s claims. Chinese stra- 
tegists also incorporate a first and second island chain on Western Pacific 
territories into their geopolitical aspirations. The first chain includes Indonesia, 
the Korean Peninsula, Kurile Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The 
second island chain includes the U.S. territories of Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands.10 
 152 
China Island Chains Map Courtesy: U.S. Department of Defense. 
 
International legal scholars have expressed concerns with the scope of China’s 
claims including mentioning that naming an area the SCS does not establish 
sovereignty over it, ambiguity over the precise meaning of China’s nine-
dashed map, and asserting that cartographic dashes do not suggest maritime 
boundary claims and have no impact on resolving maritime boundary dis- 
putes. Additional problems include cartographic materials losing credibility 
when they contradict each other, that ambiguous and incoherent cartography 
weakens the evidentiary strength of a claim in international law, ambiguity 
in defining historical waters, and that such maps need to be drawn up by 
neutral experts instead of partisan countries to enhance their probative value 
in international law.11 
 
Other Nations Claims 
 
This situation is complicated further by other nations’ claims to SCS waters, 
islands, reefs, and continental shelf. The Philippines passed a law in 2009 
saying that Scarborough Shoal and other islands Manila claims in the SCS 
(Kalayaan Island Group) will be governed under UNCLOS Article 121. The 
Philippines also notified UNCLOS’ Commission on the Limitations of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) it intends to submit limitations on its continental 
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shelf in the SCS and that it will also claim an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) claim from its main archipelago’s archipelagic baselines and will also 
claim an extended continental shelf into the SCS beyond its EEZ’s outer 
limits.12 
     On January 22, 2013, the Philippines informed the Chinese Embassy in 
Manila that they had submitted an application with UNCLOS to arbitrate 
their competing claims. This was rejected by the Chinese Ambassador to the 
Philippines on February 19 and Beijing’s refusal to arbitrate this dispute has 
strained bilateral relations between these countries and produced greater 
obstacles to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China 
reaching a binding SCS Code of Conduct.13 
     Taiwan takes a similar position to China claiming an EEZ of 200 nautical 
miles. In May 2012, Taiwanese National Security Director General Tsai Der-
Sheng announced that Vietnam and the Philippines have asked Taiwan not to 
work with China on South Sea issues. While Taipei generally favors peaceful 
solutions to territorial disputes, some Taiwanese scholars and government 
officials advocate more assertive actions. In April 2012 members of the par- 
liamentary Foreign and National Defense Committee visited Taiping island 
where they were briefed by Taiwanese troops on their defense capabilities 
and these islands have been reinforced by military personnel to augment to 
Taipei’s sovereignty claims.14 
     Malaysia has taken a nonconfrontational stance with China on this issue.  
It has strong economic relationships with Beijing who became Kuala Lum- 
pur’s largest trading partner in 2010, Malaysia does not have the military 
capacity to contest China’s claims, it does not have nationalist pressure to act 
against China, and its politicians and public opinion are more concerned with 
maritime disagreements with Indonesia.15 
     Vietnam, in contrast, takes a more assertive approach on SCS matters 
seeking to cooperate with the Philippines and Malaysia while also striving 
for balance with Beijing to keep bilateral relations from being excessively 
strained. Both Hanoi and Manila are heavily dependent on fishing though 
their economics are increasingly tied to China. China and Vietnam reached a 
Gulf of Tonkin delimitation agreement in 2000, but fought over disputed 
islands such as the Paracels in 1974 and 1988 with China occupying these 
islands and leading the Vietnamese to believe China is willing to use force to 
settle territorial disputes. Hanoi also faces domestic nationalist pressure to 
stand up to Beijing due to the centuries’ long historical enmity between these 
two countries despite both being governed by Communist Parties.  Vietnam’s 
economy depends significantly on access to adjacent energy and fishing re- 
sources and China’s nine-dashed map cutting through Vietnam’s EEZ renews 
fears in Vietnam and other claimant nations that China aspires to claim both 
island features and all waters within the nine-dashed map.16 
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    Recent years have seen numerous security incidents between China and 
these countries. In June 2012, Vietnam passed a maritime law declaring its 
jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and requiring all foreign naval 
ships to notify Vietnamese authorities before entering these areas. China ex- 
pressed its opposition to this statute by establishing a prefecture level admin- 
istrative city Sansha on the Paracel’s Woody Island which would be overseen 
by the central government. In addition, the state-owned Chinese National 
Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) contested Vietnamese energy claims by in- 
viting foreign oil companies to jointly exploit nine drilling blocks in disputed 
areas two days after the Vietnamese law’s passage. Beijing’s pressuring of 
foreign oil companies drilling in South China Sea followed upon China tell- 
ing U.S. and other foreign oil firms during Summer 2007 to stop collaborating 
with Vietnamese oil drillers or face unspecified consequences in their business 
dealings with China.17 
 
          Maritime and Territorial Disputes Involving China including Paracel Islands,  
          Scarborough Shoal, and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.  
          Courtesy: Congressional Research Service and ESRI. 
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The Philippines and China have periodically had security incidents in these 
waters. Beijing has accused the Philippines of occupying Chinese islands and 
on January 27, 2014 a Chinese coast guard vessel used a water cannon to try 
to drive away Philippine fisherman from Scarborough Shoal with Chinese 
diplomatic personnel in Manila being summoned to the Foreign Ministry to 
hear the government’s strongly worded protest. The Philippine Foreign 
Ministry said nine such harassment incidents occurred during the previous 
year and in February 2014 the U.S. Navy Commander said the U.S. would 
help the Philippines if conflict resulted over these disputed waters.18 
 
Chinese Incidents with U.S. Military in SCS and Elsewhere 
 
Chinese assertiveness of its maritime and territorial claims in the SCS has not 
been limited to adjacent countries. It has also targeted normal U.S. military 
and intelligence gathering activities in this region over the past decade. On 
March 31, 2001 a U.S. EP-3 electronic naval surveillance plane was struck 
by a Chinese fighter pilot and forced to make an emergency landing at China’s 
Hainan Island. The Chinese pilot was killed and the U.S. crew was detained 
for a eleven days before being released although China was able to gain 
some sensitive information about this plane’s technological capabilities.19 
Hainan Island has become a militarily and strategically significant location 
for China featuring a naval base hosting its first aircraft carrier, some of its 
submarine fleet, and the Wenchang Space Launch facility as part of China’s 
space program infrastructure.20 
Additional Chinese targeting of U.S. military ocean surveillance ships 
occurred with the USNS Bowditch (2001 and 2002), Bruce C. Heezen (2003), 
Victorious (2003–2004), Effective (2004), John McDonnell (2005); Mary 
Sears (2005); Loyal (2005), and Impeccable (2009). On March 5, 2009, the 
Impeccable was surrounded by five Chinese naval vessels approximately 75 
miles southeast of Hainan Island who attempted to snag the Impeccable’s 
towing cable. The U.S. Navy responded by dispatching warships to escort 
subsequent unarmed survey and ocean surveillance vessels.21 
New tensions occurred beginning November 23, 2013 when China 
established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea 
raising concern an ADIZ could be established over the SCS. With this edict, 
Beijing set rules requiring aircraft flying in this area to: 
• Report a flight plan to the Chinese government; 
• Maintain radio communication and respond to Chinese government iden- 
tification inquiries; 
• Maintain radar transponder function; and 
• Exhibit clear nationality and logo markings. 
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This announcement went on to specify that China’s military would take 
emergency defensive measures to respond to aircraft not giving required 
identification.22 
 
      Hainan Island Airbases and regional location. Courtesy: Air Power Australia 
 
On December 5, 2013, the missile cruiser USS Cowpens was conducting sur- 
veillance of China’s Liaoning carrier battle group about 32 miles southeast 
of Hainan Island. Two Chinese naval vessels approached the Cowpens with 
one of them altering course and crossing directly in front of the Cowpens bow 
forcing it to come to a complete stop to avoid a collision while the Chinese 
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ship passed less than 100 yards in front. This behavior by China violates pro- 
fessional maritime behavior such as the Convention of International Regula- 
tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea in which China participates.23 
   Further Chinese aggressiveness toward U.S. military assets occurred on 
August 19, 2014 when an armed Chinese jet fighter conducted a dangerous 
intercept of a Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft in international airspace 135 
miles east of Hainan Island. Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John 
Kirby told reporters that the Chinese jet made several passes of the Poseidon 
crossing under the aircraft within 50–100 feet.  Kirby went on to mention the 
U.S. had expressed its strong concern about this unsafe and unprofessional 
behavior to the Chinese.24 
     On September 25, 2014, U.S. Pacific Command Commander Admiral 
Samuel Locklear, when asked about increasing Chinese aircraft intercepts in 
that region, acknowledged increasing Chinese aerial and naval activity in that 
region, said the U.S. and China regularly interact about preventing misunder- 
standings or bad interactions such as the August 19 incident, and expressed 
his hope that the U.S. and China would respect each other’s international 
maritime and airspace rights.25 
 
Regional Defense Spending Increases 
 
This increasing tension occurs within a strategic context of increased defense 
spending in recent years by nations adjacent to the SCS and whose economic 
and strategic interests are directly affected by developments in its waters. The 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expendi- 
ture Database reports East Asian nations military spending increased from 
$139 billion in 1998 to $329 billion in 2014. Per capita defense spending 
figures from these counties between 1998 and 2014 also demonstrates signif- 
icant increases: 
Australia 1998  $380 2014 $1,077 
Brunei 1998  $927 2014 $1,300 
China 1998  $14.60 2014 $155 
Indonesia 1998  $3 2014 $27.80 
Japan 1998  $290 2014 $360 
Malaysia 1998  $51.80 2014 $163 
Philippines 1998  $16.50 2014 $32.90 
South Korea 1998  $226 2014 $741 
Taiwan 1998  $421 2014 $437 
Vietnam 2003  $10.50 2013 $4626 
 
The significant economic growth of many of these countries has enabled 
most of them to achieve these increased defense expenditures without having 
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this spending account for additional percentages in their annual government 
spending as the following figures demonstrate: 
Australia 1998  5.7% 2014  4.8% 
Brunei 1998  12.1% 2014  9.3% 
China 1998  11.9% 2014  7.3% 
Indonesia 1998  3.8% 2014  4.1% 
Japan 1998  2.7% 2014  2.5% 
Malaysia 1998  6.4% 2014  5.4% 
Philippines 1998  8.1% 2014  6.0% 
South Korea 1998  6.4% 2014  12.1% 
Taiwan 1998  11.6% 2014  10.6% 
Vietnam  2003  7.6% 2014  8.3%27 
 
Increasing tensions in the SCS region are likely to drive further defense 
spending increases by adjacent countries with Chinese defense spending and 
increasing regional assertiveness and the U.S.’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific likely 
to play critical roles in ensuring the SCS region’s vulnerability to regional or 
international conflict. Such conflict is likely to involve or affect powers from 
outside the SCS such as the Australia, Japan, and the U.S. and impact the 
interests of powers as far away as India and Europe.28 
 
U.S. and Allied Responses 
 
The U.S. has not taken a formal position on SCS territorial claims. At the 
July 23, 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton reaffirmed traditional U.S. support for freedom of navigation 
and respect for international law, and opposed claimants using force. She went 
on to stress that maritime claims should be derived solely from legitimate 
claims to land features. Additional characteristics of U.S. SCS policy include 
peacefully resolving territorial disputes without threats of coercion or intim- 
idation, parties avoiding taking provocative or unilateral actions which might 
disrupt the status quo and jeopardize and security, opposing claims imping- 
ing on lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea belonging to lawful 
nations, that that coastal states do not have the right under UNCLOS to 
regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ’s.29 The U.S. also issues 
annual reports on attempts by various nations to interfere with international 
freedom of navigation with the Fiscal Year 2014 report charging China with 
making excessive maritime claims including: excessive straight baselines; 
security jurisdiction in contiguous zones; airspace jurisdiction over EEZ; 
domestic law criminalizing foreign entity survey activity in EEZ; and requir- 
ing prior permission of innocent passage of foreign military ships through 
territorial seas.30 
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    A more tangible rhetorical, though economically and militarily unresolved, 
demonstration of U.S. commitment to resisting Chinese territorial claims in 
the nine-dash map is Washington’s strategic Asia-Pacific pivot originating in 
2010–2011. Based on the questionable rationale that the need for a U.S. 
military presence in the Mideast is declining and that this makes it necessary 
for the U.S. to shift its military assets and emphasis to East Asia including 
nations adjoining the SCS was articulated on a January 5, 2012 Defense 
Department document. This assessment stressed that U.S. economic and se- 
curity interests are closely linked to developments in an area encompassing 
the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South 
Asia. It went on to stress that the U.S. would expand existing relationships 
with Asian allies and key partners to enhance collective capacity for securing 
common interests.31 
     A key policy declaration from this document announced the following 
emphasis to maintain mutually cooperative dialogue with China while also 
defending its interests and those of its Asia-Pacific allies: 
 
The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, 
and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on 
an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over 
the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have 
the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a 
variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace 
and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative 
bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’s military power 
must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions 
in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States 
will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we 
maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping 
with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working 
closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to 
promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying 
stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic 
dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.32 
 
The U.S. has taken some steps to demonstrate this pivot as evidenced by a 
November 2011 agreement between President Obama and then Australian 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard deploying a few hundred Marines as a rotational 
force to Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory.33 It is also increasing its 
already significant military presence on Guam by transferring 8,000 Marines 
from the Japanese island of Okinawa which is expected to occur by 2014.  
This increased presence on Guam will also include Army construction of a 
missile defense system, the addition of Air Force drones and B-52 bombers, 
and the Navy expanded Guam’s port to accommodate visiting aircraft carriers, 
and  providing Vietnam $32 million to strengthen its maritime security.34 
 160 
     The U.S. also seeks to develop Air-Sea Battle (ASB) doctrine to leverage 
U.S. and allied air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space assets to reduce the risk 
these forces face from growing Chinese anti-access air denial (A2AD) 
capabilities seeking to prevent the U.S. and its allies from defending their 
Asia/Pacific strategic interests through longer range precision weapons tar- 
geting airbases, capital ships, land forces, network infrastructure, and space-
based platforms. This involves developing networked integrated forces to 
attack-in-depth and disrupt, defeat, and destroy hostile forces. Budgetary 
funding for this initiative, which has become the Joint Concept for Access 
and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), remains uncertain.35  
 




Courtesy: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation Agreement  
and Additional Regional Security Concerns 
 
Other nations in the region who are concerned by the Obama Administration’s 
strategic inconstancy and U.S. defense spending constraints are exploring their 
own options for enhancing cooperation against what they see as China’s 
hegemonic aspirations. An example of this is a 2014 Australian-Japanese 
Defense Cooperation Agreement. Signed on July 8, 2014 by Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, this agree- 
ment commits these countries to share relevant defense equipment and tech- 
nology to implement joint research, development, and production projects 
for enhancing security and defense cooperation consistent with the United 
Nations Charter.36 
     Australia is also acutely concerned with maintaining freedom of the seas 
due to its proximity to the SCS and other strategic waterways such as the 
Indian and Pacific Ocean.37 In its consultation document for a proposed 2015 
Defense White Paper Australia’s Department of Defense included maritime 
sovereignty disputes in North Asia and the SCS as areas of emerging security 
concerns which might require direct Australian involvement.38 
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     Singaporean analyses of this issue stress the need for all parties to con- 
tinue dialogue, strive for maximum collaboration between interested states, 
stress the limited possibility of short or medium-term conflict, but remain 
concern about the possibility for miscalculations and limited confrontations, 
and prefer placing less emphasis on sovereignty issues and more on joint 
resource exploration and development.39 
     India considers the Straits of Malacca leading from the SCS to the Indian 
Ocean as a primary area of strategic concern and the SCS itself as a 
secondary concern in its official Maritime Strategy document.40 The 2014 
edition of the East Asian Strategic Review published by Japan’s National 
Institute of Defence Studies notes that tension continues between ASEAN 
nations and China over territorial and maritime rights in the SCS. It noted 
ASEAN and made partial progress to develop a “code of conduct” with 
Beijing on this topic. In addition, this assessment also recognized strengthen- 
ing Philippine-U.S. military cooperation such as the April 2013 Balikatan 
(Shoulder-to-Shoulder) military exercise involving Japan and other countries 
and also noted that the U.S. tilt/rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific would see 
Washington reinforce its military presence in the Philippines by increasing 
its number of naval vessel calls at Subic Bay and by increasing its military 




China’s nine-dashed map is an example of an aspiring hegemon seeking to 
assert its muscle by coercively influencing its neighbors to submit to its 
strategic objectives. An example of Beijing’s rhetorical assertiveness was 
reflected in July 2013 when Chinese President Xi Jinping asserted: “we need 
to do more to take interest in the sea, understand the sea, and strategically 
manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to be- 
come a maritime power.”42 It is not surprising that it makes such audacious 
and unrealistic geopolitical claims at a time when the Obama Administration 
is seen as being unwilling to forcibly defend U.S. geopolitical interests in this 
part of the world by its inaction and hesitancy in other global crisis areas.43 
     It would be desirable if the U.S. and other powers affected by SCS 
developments would peacefully work to peacefully resolve their disputes in 
this region. An Australian analyst suggests that a cooperative management 
regime is necessary for the common interests of claimant countries. He 
believes a management entity for the SCS should be established, comprised 
of all surrounding countries, and that ASEAN and China should establish 
this organization with the U.S. bringing the experience of ocean management 
instead of increased military engagement. This approach is unlikely to work 
long-term due to China’s reluctance to submit to international arbitration on 
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this issue and seeking to exploit ASEAN member countries internal politics 
to its benefit. It is also not likely to work as long as China engages in victim 
rhetoric on SCS and other international affairs topics.44 
     The U.S. should maintain regular discussion with China and candidly 
express its concerns about Beijing’s aggressive actions in the SCS. The U.S. 
should also increase its cooperation and collaboration with its regional part- 
ners to make the costs of Chinese aggression to high. Specific examples of 
this would include conducting regular military exercises with partner countries, 
providing them with targeted military assets to deter and defeat Chinese 
aggressiveness such as A2AD efforts, augmenting Vietnam’s Army, and 
augmenting the military and intelligence capabilities of allied SCS nations, 
developing financially and strategically realistic doctrine for implementing 
JAM-GC, threaten to support Uighur separatists in Western China, and 
explicitly and publicly warning China that harassment of U.S. intelligence and 
military activities and assets in the SCS will result in the use of lethal force. 
     U.S. and international policymakers should heed the following words from 
Representative Steve Chabot (R-OH) who chaired the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on January 14, 2014: 
 
We are witnessing a dangerously aggressive China trying to assert 
greater control over these territories to change the regional status 
quo in a way that violates the core principles of international law.  
The implications of these actions for the United States are substantial 
since we have strategic and economic interests that are increasingly 
threatened by the growing tension and confrontational incidents in 
these waters. 
      An American presence in Asia is built on maintaining peace 
and stability that is upheld through respect for international law, 
freedom of navigation, and unhindered, lawful commerce in the 
maritime regions. This is pursued through our alliances with Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, in addition 
to our steadfast relationships with Taiwan and Singapore, and 
evolving relationships with Vietnam and Indonesia.45  
 
While much of American public opinion may be way weary, we must 
recognize that the persistence of international crisis and potential military 
conflict is inexorable. The world should carefully watch China’s response to 
pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong as an important indication of 
its potential future activities in the SCS. China’s nine-dashed map claims for 
the South China Sea may or may not produce international conflict, but the 
U.S. and its allies would be wise to prepare domestic public opinion and 
militaries for the possibility of such conflict in the years to come. Instead of 
being serene in the 21st century, the SCS and significant areas of the Pacific 
Ocean, may become the scene of explosive combat and augment what scholar 
Colin Gray has described as Another Bloody Century between multiple mili- 
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tary powers due to this region’s growing economic and strategic importance, 
increasing military spending, and competition between powers for access to 
and control of its resources by powers as far flung as Australia, China, India, 
the United States, and other countries.46 
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